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THE STAKE OF THE SCHEDULED AIRLINES
IN
SOUND AIRPORT DEVELOPMENT
By JAMES C. BucKLEY
President of James C. Buckley, Inc., New York City, terminal and
transportation consultants. Formerly, Director of Airport Develop-

ment for The Port of New York Authority; Member of Advisory
Committee of the Airport Operators Council; American Association
of Airport Executives and Airport Division of the American Road
Builders Association.
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OR the better part of two decades scheduled airlines and airport
operators from coast to coast have been slugging it out over the conference table to reach agreement on rates, charges and rights at existing
or contemplated airport facilities. Out of these agreements has developed a national structure of rates, charges and rights at airline airports
which is generally considered to reflect the desires of the scheduled airlines.' At least it can be said that at most of the nation's major air
traffic centers, airline-airport agreements have been executed which
incorporated substantially the arrangements desired at the time by the
representatives of the scheduled airlines.
With this background, one might reasonably expect to find in the
United States today a system of airline airports which would be able to
contribute in full measure to the maximum development of commercial air traffic, and the accommodation of that traffic by scheduled airlines at minimum expense. Unfortunately, the nation's present airline
airport system falls far short of meeting this test. For example,
1-LAGUARDIA at New York, which handles more scheduled air passengers than any other airport, has outmoded terminal facilities which
require costly duplicate installations by the scheduled airlines and
the processing of the bulk of airline passengers through temporary
facilities remote from restaurants, bars, and other revenue-producing concessions.
2-CHICAGO, the nation's second largest airline stop, is struggling with
almost impossible congestion at its present airport. In seeking to
concentrate all scheduled airline business for the entire Chicago region at its new O'Hare Airport, it may well be further hurting the
scheduled airlines by putting an impossible barrier of ground time
in the way of traffic which otherwise would move by air.
8-WASHINGTON, the country's third largest center for scheduled air

passengers, has recently been much in the news because of its congested air space which is aggravated by the proximity of two military air bases.
4-DETROIT, potentially one of the nation's top airline markets, is
increasingly handicapped by having its airline airport 31 miles
1 CHARLES S. RHYNE, AIRPORT LEASE AND CONCESSION AGREEMENTS.
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from the center of the city, and even further from some of its major air traffic centers.
5-BOSTON, with a heavy State investment in Logan International Airport, still lacks a permanent central terminal building and faces the
prospect of activating its new Apron Building without the facilities

for developing concession revenues and other ancillary income
which should be available from its heavy airline traffic.
Cleveland, Newark, St. Louis, Houston, Cincinnati, Kansas City and
Philadelphia are others among the nation's larger air centers which are

facing major problems of airport development, - and there are many
more. Hardly a day passes .which does not see an airport operator somewfiere in the country making decisions which will have their reflection
in the future profit and loss statements of the scheduled airlines.
It must be emphasized that these are not rate decisions, but much
more basic decisions as to airport location, layout and design, facilities,
and operating procedures. These are the decisions which determine in
the long run:
1-How much traffic the scheduled airlines can develop at the airport.
2-How economically that traffic can be handled.
3-How much ancillary revenue can be developed to reduce the burden
of terminal charges on the scheduled carriers.

And these are also the decisions which emphasize the community of
interest between airport operators and the scheduled airlines. Forty
acres and a mule may make a farm, but 500 acres and an airplane are a
long way from being an airport. Without adequate airport facilities,
the airline is helpless to develop its full traffic potential or handle its
traffic economically. Without effective development of the air traffic,
the continued operation and development of adequate airport facilities
cannot be justified. The functions of the airport operator and the
scheduled airline are completely complementary. Here are two parties
who certainly ought to be scratching each other's backs, not scratching
each other's eyes out.
There isn't much question that by and large the airport operators
appreciate their stake in sound airline development. Generous incentive leases in city after city have resulted in the absorption of continuous deficits by airport operators to provide facilities for scheduled
*airlines at a price which the airlines felt they could afford to pay. But
this preoccupation with price on the part of the airlines, to the exclusion of the quality of the facilities, has produced a system of airline airports which falls woefully short of meeting present and prospective
airline needs.
Stake Greater Than Price
It is time to appreciate that the stake of the scheduled airlines in
sound airport development is far greater than merely the price paid for
the use of the facilities or the rights which can be negotiated as part of
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that price. Suppose, for example, that the scheduled airlines, as the result of their airport negotiations, were paying one-third less today for
the use of airport facilities than they would otherwise have to pay.
Through concentration on the price phase of their stake in airport
development, they enjoy, therefore, an annual saving of probably no
more than $2 million.
Against that, however, they have a system of airline airports which is
not conducive to full development of air traffic in many communities;
which is seldom geared to economical airline operation; and which is
often lacking in facilities for the development of ancillary revenues.
Let's see what concentration on some of these factors might mean to the
airlines in dollars and cents:
1- An annual increase in revenue passenger miles of
only 1/2 of 11% as the result of improvements in airport location, access highways, ground transportation arrangements, and in-town terminals would
mean, at current volume, increased annual airline
passenger revenues of about ....................
$2,000,000
2 - At present ratios between freight and passenger revenues, this would mean increased annual freight
revenue of about .............................
$ 200,000
3 - An average saving of only 500 per scheduled aircraft
movement from improvement in airport layout to
reduce taxiing distances between runways, terminals and hangar areas would mean, at current volumes, an annual saving of about ................
$1,800,000
4 - Most terminal buildings and the adjacent ramp area
have not been designed for economical airline operation. The handling of passengers' baggage and
mail and the costs of spotting and servicing aircraft
on the ramp are usually higher than they would
need to be with efficient terminal ramp design. If,
through cooperative effort, the airlines could save
only 1/2 of 1% of their ground costs, they would enjoy an additional annual saving of about ........ $1,000,000
5 - The development of additional net concession revenue to the airports of only 50 per airline passenger
per year from improvements in terminal design and
passenger handling procedures would mean additional annual airport revenue not required from
$1,500,000
the scheduled airlines of about ..................
These few examples illustrate the fact that the scheduled airlines
have a much greater stake in sound airport development than merely
the price tag which goes on the finished product. Airlines and airports
together have far more to gain in dollars and cents by working together
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to expand air traffic and airport revenue and to reduce airline operating
costs than they can save or gain by placing their primary emphasis on
rates and charges. To paraphrase the slogan of a popular radio program, "It's cooperation, - three to one."
The typical pattern of airline-airport cooperation in the United
States has been to delegate discussions of airport location, layout and
design, facilities, and operating procedures to so-called "Technical
Committees" of airline personnel. In general there is no question but
that these Committees have done a constructive, worthwhile job in
working with airport operators. But their primary function has not
been to relate location, design and layout, facilities, and operating procedures to the broad policy problems which confront airports and airlines alike, - that is to the questions of expanding air traffic, reducing
air carrier costs and expanding non-flight revenue.
When the negotiations have reached the level of the so-called "Top
Committees," where policy might appropriately be considered, the
emphasis is usually shifted to a concerted drive by the airport operator
to get rates as high as possible and a concerted effort by the airline representatives to get rates as low as possible, neither group having too
much regard either for what is a fair rate for the facilities and services
offered or whether those facilities will really be suitable for full development of air traffic, economical air carrier operation and efficient
exploitation of ancillary revenues'.
The real future of air transportation lies on the ground. In the past
eight years, the flying costs per available ton-mile of the domestic scheduled airlines have remained almost unchanged, - while ground and
indirect expenses have increased about 20 percent. In September,
1949, there were 693 communities in the United States certificated for
scheduled air service, of which 254 were not being served, many because
of the lack of adequate airport facilities. You can fly from Los Angeles
to New York at 60 per passenger mile, but when you get on the ground
at LaGuardia Airport, you will pay 13.50 per mile to ride the airport
limousine to mid-town Manhattan. A 100-pound shipment of air
freight from New York to Chicago will cost only $8.80 for the line-haul
transportation, but pick-up in New York and delivery in Chicago will
add 27%, or another $2.35.
The location of airports, the economy and efficiency of ground
transportation of air passengers and cargo, the economy and efficiency of
airport installations and operating procedures, and the ability of airport facilities to produce ancillary revenue are the keys to expanded
air traffic, reductions in costs of operation for scheduled airlines, and
the absorption of a greater portion of airport costs by non-airline revenues. Airport operators throughout the country are being called upon
every day to make decisions on these problems which are of vital consequence to the scheduled airlines. Unfortunately many such decisions
are being made without the 'cooperation of the scheduled airlines, per-
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haps because of their traditional preoccupation with the price tag on
airport facilities and services, or perhaps because they fail to appreciate
the importance to their industry of sound airport development and
operation. In either event, it will be worthwhile to discuss the effect of
some of these decisions on the volume of traffic and economy of operation of the scheduled airlines.
,LOCATION OF NEW AIRPORTS

Between 15 and 20 of the country's major air traffic centers will
outgrow their present airport facilities in the next five years. In many
cases the existing airport does not lend itself to expansion and new airport sites will have to be selected and developed. With limited municipal borrowing power, the cheapest site is usually the most attractive.
But the cheapest site is usually the most distant from the center of the
city and therefore the least productive of air traffic. Cooperation in airport location studies at major air centers can pay the scheduled airlines
handsome profits through the increased traffic which can be generated
at good airport locations. It will be good business to pay higher rates
for a close-in airport which will generate maximum air traffic, rather
than to seek a bargain-counter airport which usually is not a good
traffic generator.
RUNWAY LENGTH AND STRENGTH AT EXISTING AND NEW AIRPORTS

The larger and heavier aircraft now in use and in prospect mean
lower line-haul costs per seat-mile and per available ton-mile, but they
mean heavier costs to the airport operator in terms of more expensive
runway, taxiway, and apron construction and higher maintenance
charges. Obviously such improved aircraft cannot be of maximum benefit to the airlines unless airports are available which will permit their
use without crippling restrictions on payload such as now exist at 'a
good many airports.
To get such airports, however, costs money. At existing airports, the
airport operator finds little inducement to strengthen or lengthen the
runways to accommodate new aircraft since his flight fees are usually
fixed under long-term leases. Any additional capital investment under
such inflexible arrangements simply means a greater deficit for the
airport. Where new airports are under consideration, it is easy to build
the type of runways which will best serve the scheduled air carriers if
the carriers will agree on the kind of runways they want, and if they
will avoid trying to price their use of the airport so low that the desired
runways are impossible to finance. That is the real nub of the problem.
In this connection, it is worthwhile to remember that if restrictions
at a particular airport reduce the payload of only one scheduled flight
per day by 1000 pounds, it will mean a loss to the carrier at an average
haul of only 200 miles of about 75,000 available ton-miles per year.
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At 60% potential load factor and 40¢ per ton-mile average revenue,
this means a revenue loss to the carrier from one scheduled flight per
day of $18,000 per year, or about $50 per departure. Pricing problems
at airports are of minor significance compared to stakes of this magnitude which can be gained through sound airport development.
AERIAL APPROACHES TO EXISTING AND NEW AIRPORTS

The advent of larger and heavier aircraft and the concurrent development of improved instrument landing devices and procedures have
resulted at many airports in serious problems with respect to the marking or removal of obstructions to aerial navigation in the vicinity of
the airport. An airport designed or planned for operation with 40 to 1
approach protection under conditions of 500 foot ceilings and 1,mile
visibility, faces a very substantial capital outlay to provide 50 to 1
approach protection and provision for operation under conditions of
200 foot ceilings and !/ mile visibility. But scheduled airlines cannot
develop their full traffic potential unless they can achieve greater schedule reliability than has been possible in the past. The CAA program
for the installation of improved landing aids has gone a long way toward making this technically possible, - provided the airport approaches permit utilization of this equipment to its full potential. But
the rub again is the cost of protecting these approaches. It has been
estimated that the scheduled airlines in 1948 lost millions of dollars
because of weather delays and cancellations. Here again the scheduled
airlines could expect a handsome profit from sound business arrangements with airport operators which would permit the airports to finance the acquisition of land and air easements and the marking of
obstructions so as to realize the full benefits of the costly landing aids
which the Federal government is now installing throughout the
country.
RUNWAY LAYOUT

Expansion of present airports and planning of new airports brings
into sharp focus the problem of runway layout and its effect on costs
of operation of scheduled airlines. The problem has two facets:
1 - The number of runways to be provided.
2 - The layout of those runways.

Larger and heavier aircraft no-,# in use and in prospect can land and
take-off safely with a much higher cross-wind component than the
aircraft previously in use. This means that in most locations, there is
no longer need for the conventional 3-runway airport for commercial
air transportation. Substantial savings can be made in initial investment and maintenance costs by substituting a 2-runway or in some
cases even a single-runway plan. A similar dividend can be realized at
many existing airports by abandoning an existing runway or runways
and developing non-flight revenues from the land so released. But such
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planning requires close and sympathetic cooperation between the airport operator and the scheduled airlines who ultimately will reap the
greatest benefit from the airport's savings from a smaller number of
runways.
Entirely apart from the number of runways, their layout in relation
to terminal buildings and hangars can make a great difference in the
cost of operation of scheduled airlines. At many airports it is necessary
to taxi a country mile to and from the hangars and the terminal building. And taxiing costs money, not only in terms of direct costs, but
also in terms of reduced equipment utilization and slower schedules.
Consider, for example, that in the twelve months ended September 30,
1949, there were 3,600,000 commercial aircraft movements at airports
in the continental United States. If only 50¢ per movement were saved
through improved airport layout which would decrease taxiing distance and time, the airlines would save $1,800,000 per year in operating costs. But such savings can only be realized through close cooperation between airlines and airport operators.
TERMINAL BUILDING DESIGN AND OPERATION

Nowhere do the airlines and the airport operators have so strong a
community of interest as in the design and operation of the terminal
building. Here air transportation and ground transportation meet and
are married, - either efficiently and productively, or inefficiently and
unproductively. To achieve efficiency and productivity for both airline
and airport operator requires agreement on objectives and operating
techniques which has been missing in many negotiations.
Some airline executives see an airport as nothing more than a transportation terminal, and have a consuming desire to reduce the terminal
building to a glorified platform across which to hustle their passengers
with the greatest possible dispatch. Some airport executives on the
other hand see an airport as everything but a transportation terminal,
and would willingly subordinate the terminal handling of passengers,
freight, mail, and aircraft to the sale of peanuts, popcorn, and crackerjack.
Design and operating decisions which are being made now in many
major air centers can put a needless cost burden on the scheduled airlines for years to come. To avoid this burden, agreement is needed on
many basic questions. For example:
I - Should the terminal building provide for centralized or decentralized handling of air passengers?
2 - Should the terminal provide loading gates for the exclusive
use of individual airlines, or should all gates be available for
use in common?
3 - Should ramp service be provided by individual airlines, or on
a consolidated basis either by the airlines, the airport or a
private contractor?
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4 -- How will air freight be handled at the airport?
5 - How will porter and other terminal services be provided?
These are but a few of the many problems with respect to terminal
building design and operation which have an important bearing on
the costs of scheduled airlines as well as on, the revenues of airport
operators. There are many others. The potential savings are great
enough to merit the attention of the best brains in both industries
working cooperatively for their mutual advantage.
HANDLING OF AVIATION GASOLINE

The increasing size and range of aircraft, coupled with heavier volumes of air traffic, have so increased the volume of gasoline loaded at
individual airports as to make the problem of safe and efficient gasoline
handling one of the most pressing problems now facing airport operators. It is equally important to scheduled airlines whose consumption
is so great that techniques which decrease the cost a fraction of a cent
per gallon will mean important dollar savings in the course of a year.
Today at most terminal-type airports the scheduled airlines buy
their gasoline from a supplier of their choice who delivers it to airline
storage tanks located on airport property. It is then delivered into
planes by gasoline tank trunks rented from or donated by the gasoline
supplier, which trucks are manned by airline personnel. As a result,
each airline must have sufficient storage capacity, sufficient tank trucks,
and sufficient gasoline-handling personnel to handle its own individual
peak requirements. If one gasoline supplier has three airline customers
at the same airport, there will be three separate storage installations for
the same brand of gasoline, and three separate fleets of tank trucks for
that brand, - one for each airline which uses it. At LaGuardia Airport
where this technique was established by the airlines, it has been estimated that there are three times as many gasoline tank trucks in service
on the airport as would be required under a more efficient system of
gasoline handling.
From the airport operator's standpoint, there is a limit to the size
of the tank farm which can safely be located on airport property, and
to the number of gasoline tank trucks, each loaded with 2,000 to 4,000
gallons of high-octane gasoline, which can safely be accommodated on
the airport highways and ramp area, - to say nothing of the cost of
providing such facilities for which the airline leases frequently provide
no rental payments. And the whole system becomes impracticable when
one thinks in terms of loading 500,000 gallons of gasoline per day at
one airport, as may be the case at New York International Airport
within the next ten years.
There are several alternatives which offer a better basis both for
the airport operator and for the airline. It would serve no useful purpose to pro and con each of these here. It is important, however, to
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remember that the fundamental objective is to store gasoline at airports
and deliver it into the planes at the lowest possible cost to the user.
To achieve that objective requires airline-airport cooperation in planning efficient and economical airport facilities and procedures. Neither
party can do it alone.
FINANCING OF AIRPORT IMPROVEMENTS

There is no major air traffic center whose airport doesn't require
some type of capital improvement. These include new or extended
runways, new or expanded terminal buildings, additional land, and
air rights to protect the aerial approaches to the facility. In almost
every case, however, the competition for limited municipal borrowing
power is being decided in favor of schools, hospitals, libraries, streets,
sewers, water systems, and other essential municipal services, and
against additional general obligation funds for airport development.
Essential improvements at both Cleveland and San Francisco have
been delayed more than a year because of the failure of the voters to
approve the necessary bond issues in the fall of 1948. In the New York
Region, it is doubtful if The Port of New York Authority would be in
the airport business had not the cities of Newark and New York found
it impossible further to finance their airport programs with general
obligation bonds.
These examples reflect the increasing unwillingness of cities to
absorb continuing airport deficits now that commercial air transportation has matured and taken its place as a permanent and essential part
of the domestic transportation system. That business generally shares
this view is indicated by the December, 1949, conclusion of the Transportation and Communications Department Committee of the United
States Chamber of Commerce that, "Airports should be placed on a
self-sustaining basis as soon as possible." Only through putting their
relations with airports on a sound business basis can the scheduled
airlines reasonably expect airport operators to seek to finance the heavy
backlog of essential airport development required at major air terminals.
This does not mean that the scheduled airlines should pay more
than their fair share of airport costs. It does involve, however, a recognition on the part of the scheduled airlines that the airport operator
has an obligation to see to it that his rates reflect his costs and other pertinent factors, that they have sufficient flexibility to protect him against
changes in his costs, and that they do not unjustly discriminate against
any of his various classes of tenants and airport users. Such a basis for
airport negotiations should certainly impose no undue burden on
scheduled air carriers since these are the same factors which must, of
necessity, be considered by any landlord with whom they may negotiate
for space or privileges.
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CONCLUSION

These few examples illustrate the significance to scheduled airlines
of sound airport development entirely apart from the price which may
finally be agreed upon for the use of such facilities. Manufacturing to
a price seldom results in a high-grade product, - and that is as true of
airports as it might be of hair pins. The stake which the scheduled airlines have in sound airport development is far greater than any transitory gain which may be realized through price pressures. If agreement
be reached on favorable airport location, efficient and economical airport layout and design, productive airport facilities and economical
airport operating procedures, it will not be difficult to arrive at a fair
price for their use. But that price will be a minor factor compared to
the tangible financial benefits which can accrue to the scheduled airlines from sound airport development.

